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1. INTRODUCTION
ON 13 August 2006, the Center for Global Development released that year’s commitmentto development index (CDI), an attempt to rank donors by their overall contribution to
development, placing Japan last in 21st place. Within a month, the Japanese Ministry of For-
eign Affairs released a statement arguing that ‘this Index neglects the strengths of Japanese
aid, drawing on a certain value judgement’ (MOFA, 2006). This incident could be interpreted
as highlighting CDIs ineffectiveness in the task of influencing policy, given that their judge-
ment was so summarily dismissed. Alternatively, the fact that Japan engaged with the mea-
sure so quickly could constitute evidence of its success, showing the power of an index to
stimulate debate. In the intervening years, the number and profile of rankings have grown.
This increase has taken place in the context of a desire to increase the effectiveness of foreign
aid, given the lack of robust evidence of any growth-promoting aid effect (Roodman, 2007).
Clist (2011) has shown that bilateral donors are heterogeneous, and Kilby and Dreher (2010)
argue that this causes a differential aid effect. Collier and Dollar (2002) even claim that aid-
induced poverty reduction could double as a result of allocating aid differently. If gains of
this magnitude are possible, it is clear that even partially successful political pressure on
donors could reap large dividends. This makes change at the donor level very promising, and
rankings are often designed for this task. Thus, to their supporters, rankings offer not only a
useful judgement on current practice, but more importantly represent a mechanism for
improving aid effectiveness. To their detractors, rankings simply draw on ‘a certain value
judgement’, and so are rightly dismissed.
The role and validity of donor performance measures are examined in light of their stated
aims and growing popularity. In a thoughtful essay, Roodman (2011b, p. 483) admits that
composite indices ‘are inherently crass’ but argues that this is justifiable ‘as long as the aggre-
gation methods and implied valuations are clear, and there is honesty about the goal of public
communication’. Høyland et al. (2012) argue that one way to improve indices (they focus on
data from Doing Business, the human development index and Freedom House) is to incorpo-
rate a measure of uncertainty into the index, to give a better understanding of the level of
uncertainty and measurement error. A competing viewpoint is that indices should not be
improved but abandoned, as they are not just crass but unhelpful. This viewpoint has been
expressed in the context of poverty measures, where these issues have been debated more
thoroughly. Ravallion (2011) questions the very need for aggregation arguing that a range of
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disaggregated measures is a preferred alternative. This scepticism has a long tradition; McGil-
livray (1991) asked if the human development index was ‘yet another redundant composite
development indicator’. It is interesting to note that this author was concurrently proposing an
index of donor performance. This highlights the extent to which the literature on donor per-
formance measures has run in parallel to the more general critique of composite indicators.
This paper is an attempt to remedy this by bringing relevant insights to bear on influential
rankings and indices.
I focus on measures of how desirably a given amount of aid is allocated among potential
recipients (donor allocative performance). This is not to say other aspects of aid policy are
unimportant, rather this focus is chosen as one of the few aspects that a number of indices
deal with, allowing for a comparison of alternative approaches. The plurality of measures is
easily explained by the relative importance and ease of measurement of allocative perfor-
mance. In Section 2, I seek to make clear the number of decisions that are taken in designing
an index of donor performance, focusing on five measures. The section discusses three simple
choices: what to measure, how to measure and how to aggregate. Section 3 presents some
simple sensitivity tests, showing how measures change when various methodological choices
are varied. Only minimal changes are made, and yet each change leads to different rankings.
Section 4 presents results from these five measures, and shows that their judgements overlap
very little. I argue that this threatens to undermine the aim of descriptive indices, as political
pressure is difficult to sustain in the face of contradictory and competing judgements that are
not robust to minimal methodological changes. Section 5 discusses solutions to this problem,
presenting a graphical alternative which avoids the major problems of the descriptive
approach. Section 6 concludes.
2. THE DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH
I focus on five performance measures of donor allocative performance, chosen as represen-
tative of the most influential and/or recent approaches. Some of these are a more general mea-
sure of which I discuss only the subcomponent that deals with selectivity. First, the MPI
(McGillivray performance index; McGillivray, 1989) is an index that starts by attaching a
weight to each potential recipient according to its desirability. As the weights fit within the
range 0 to 1, they can be thought of as discounts applied to aid given to less desirable recipi-
ents. Aid to the richest country is completely disregarded (i.e. it is given a weight of 0), and
aid to the poorest country is not discounted (i.e. a weight of 1). The final index is then the
sum of weighted aid divided by all aid, scaled to fit between 0 and 100. If all aid were given
to the poorest recipient, then the donor would receive 100: the best possible score. Second,
the API (adjusted performance index) is McGillivray’s (1992) attempt to respond to criticisms
of the MPI regarding how it includes population. Specifically, as aid per capita is used in the
MPI, the perverse situation can arrive where a reallocation from a large poor country to a
small rich country can improve performance (White, 1992). This is because a set amount of
aid is larger in per capita terms when given to less populous countries. To combat this, the
API uses population divided by income as the weight, with the maximum score now obtained
by giving to the recipient with the largest population/income score. The third, RPI (Roodman
performance index) is the selectivity weight used in the wider CDI discussed in the introduc-
tion. It is perhaps the most high-profile index discussed here, as it is used explicitly by the
Dutch and Finnish governments, has influenced Australian, Canadian and Norwegian policy,
angered Japanese officials and is supported financially by ten bilateral donors (Roodman,
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2006). The RPI resembles both the MPI and API, but policy1 replaces population as a factor
of interest. Population does influence another part of the broader index in determining prolif-
eration, but is not incorporated into the measure of selectivity at all. The policy and poverty
weights are found separately in a similar fashion to the MPI and API, and then multiplied
together to obtain the weight used in the index. The fourth, EW (Easterly and Williamson,
2011) does not sit within the traditional index method, but rather uses the headcount measure.
This means that it calculates the percentage of a donor’s aid that meets a given criterion.
Three variables are chosen and given additive weights: low-income countries (50 per cent),
politically free countries (25 per cent, based on Polity VI data) and less corrupt countries (25
per cent, based on ICRG data). Thus any aid to a country that meets all three criteria receives
a weight of 1, with weights of 0.75, 0.5, 0.25 and 0 for other countries, depending on which
criteria they meet. The fifth measure, KRE (Knack et al., 2011) uses the average of three
coefficient estimates from a sparsely specified regression: aid is regressed on income, policy2
and population (where all variables are logged). The coefficient estimates are then combined
to give a final score.
a. The Aim and Approach of Rankings
Measures of donor allocative behaviour typically aim to change the behaviour they mea-
sure (Easterly and Williamson, 2011; Knack et al., 2011). Birdsall (2011) states three ways in
which this might happen: by changing the focus of a debate, by highlighting certain technical
issues and by encouraging advocacy through public communication. These three ways clearly
overlap, and can be subsumed under the general heading of policy influence. Roodman
(2011b) states that their main use is in educating the public, which is the first step in creating
political pressure for a change in behaviour. For this purpose, rankings offer clear advantages:
they condense a large amount of information into an easily understood format. Furthermore,
they are media-friendly sources of national pride, shame and controversy. This feeds into the
aim of changing donor behaviour through influencing public opinion.
The aim of public education explains not only the relatively simple methods of presenta-
tion, but also the preference for simple methods of measurement. The selection of simple,
easy-to-understand methods coincides with a growing distrust of regressions (Roodman,
2007). This distinguishes the descriptive research from explanatory research (e.g. Alesina and
Dollar, 2000; Berthelemy and Tichit, 2004; Clist, 2011), which seeks to explain allocations
by fully specifying a regression. By contrast, the descriptive approach merely describes a cer-
tain aspect of an allocation, meaning they are more ad hoc and flexible in their approach. In
avoiding the need to fully specify regressions, descriptive measures often claim to be method-
ologically simpler and by implication more trustworthy: this claim can be found in Roodman
(2004; p. 18) a descriptive approach ‘minimizes questions about proper modeling specifica-
tion’, Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006; p. 1179) ‘we follow Roodman . . . who stresses the risk
that cross-country regression models are misspecified and, thus, favours a simpler approach’,
and Easterly and Williamson (2011, p. 2)‘Once the Pandora’s box of conditioning factors is
opened, it is very hard to decide where to begin or where to stop’. However, this claim is not
quite as well established as it is widely repeated. While it is clear that these approaches do
1 Specifically, this is an average of the six measures of the Worldwide Governance Indicators.
2 The variable used is the country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) score.
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not claim to know the data generating process, this does not automatically equate with mini-
mising questions of proper specification. It merely means choosing a different set of ques-
tions: it is with those questions that this section deals.
b. What to Measure
The variables chosen in any measure seek to reflect a factor that is thought to constitute
part of the latent variable under examination. In many cases, the latent variable is rather grand
and difficult to define, but here it is donor allocative performance: the desirability of a distri-
bution of a given amount of aid among a given set of potential recipients. Some of the indices
I discuss have a broader focus, of which I examine merely the selectivity subcomponent. Hav-
ing decided the latent variable, there are two questions related to what to measure: the factors
and variables. Which factors make up allocative performance is surprisingly contentious. Clist
(2011) introduced the 4P framework (poverty, population, policy and proximity) to explain
aid allocation, the first three of which are the most commonly mentioned factors in normative
accounts (Llavador and Roemer, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002). Poverty has the broadest
appeal, and is typically measured using income per capita given incomplete poverty data.
This proxies for both the amount of poverty in a country and the resources for dealing with
this poverty. All five measures discussed here include it. Population is a measure both of the
amount of poverty (in combination with a measure of income per capita) and potentially the
marginal effectiveness of aid.3 Most normative accounts discuss population and most mea-
sures include it; however, the RPI and EW are completely insensitive to population in the
selectivity part. This leads to some surprising implications; insensitivity to population means
that all donors could improve their RPI selectivity score by reallocating all of their aid to the
Pacific island of Kiribati (with a population of around 100,000).
The idea that the policy environment of a country influences the marginal effectiveness of
aid is widely recognised due to Collier and Dollar (2002), but also hotly contested. An alter-
native rationale for allocating aid in response to policy is to incentivise certain policy environ-
ments. While the RPI, EW and KRE include policy, the API and MPI do not. In both cases
the exclusion of policy is explained as the direct result of a normative belief that aid should
be allocated on income (and population) grounds alone (White and McGillivray, 1995). How-
ever, the selection of what to measure is influenced by a normative vision in every case, be it
explicit or implicit. All measures of donor allocative performance will necessarily contain a
judgement as to the correct factors to include, which will reflect certain ideals and beliefs.
While these three factors (Poverty, Population and Policy) are the most commonly discussed,
none of the five measures are always sensitive to all of them (Anderson and Clist, 2011). This
is due to both deliberate decisions resulting from normative differences and technical features
of the measures.
It is worth noting that measures of policy or governance differ from measures of income
and population in that they are necessarily more subjective: there is disagreement over the
underlying factor not just the specific variable. While there may be technical disagreements
regarding the correct measure of income or population, there is greater room for philosophical
and political disagreements regarding what constitutes a good policy or institutional environ-
3 If there are fixed costs or economies of scale in providing aid to a given country, then population
would be one factor that influences the marginal effectiveness of aid.
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ment. Disagreement on the donor side is obvious, for example, there are clear differences of
opinion between the United States and Nordic donors over the correct type of regulation in an
industry. Between researchers creating indices, this disagreement can be more subtle. For
example, Easterly and Williamson (2011) and Knack et al. (2011) both purport to measure
policy selectivity. To represent this, the latter use the World Bank’s in-house measure of pol-
icy (CPIA) that emphasises public sector and economic management, whereas the former are
more focused on political freedom and corruption. The difference in variable choice reflects a
more fundamental disagreement. Both sets of authors argue that they are measuring selectiv-
ity, despite very different theoretical conceptualisations of what constitutes policy selectivity.
c. How to Measure
One dividing line between explanatory and descriptive research is that descriptive research
typically measures absolute characteristics, whereas explanatory research measures condi-
tional characteristics. The desirability of controlling for other factors depends upon the goal
of the research. Knack et al. (2011) argue, from within the descriptive tradition, that control-
ling for other factors is useful if the judgements are to be used to influence policy, as it con-
trols for the limitations on donor actions. However, the approach of KRE appears flawed as
they control for only some aspects of allocation but leave out important confounding factors
such as historical, linguistic and commercial links between recipient and donor. As such, it
cannot be thought of as a fully specified regression, but neither does it constitute a test that
is always sensitive to the three factors it measures (Anderson and Clist, 2011). In this way,
the approach of KRE appears to miss out on the absolute advantages of both the descriptive
and explanatory approaches. Easterly and Williamson (2011) argue that examining absolute
sensitivity provides an informative alternative, complementing explanatory work. This seems
a sensible role for explanatory research, as while the positive literature is more econometri-
cally advanced, it might be that controlling for other factors masks population, policy and
income sensitivity in absolute terms. Imagine that the positive literature finds that a given
donor has low income-sensitivity but high concern for former colonies: clearly a donor’s will-
ingness to support its former colonies may be the best explanation of its aid allocation. How-
ever, if these colonies are also poor, the positive coefficient on colonies will dampen the
coefficient on income – which may lead the reader to underestimate the absolute poverty-
selectivity of the donor. If donors are to decrease fragmentation they should not be punished
for allowing colonial and linguistic links to influence allocation patterns, as this promises to
reduce proliferation and therefore transaction costs. This makes absolute judgements of pov-
erty sensitivity a useful tool in judging donors, as conditional judgements of poverty-sensitiv-
ity may mislead. Any conditional effect is clearly best estimated within the explanatory
approach, and the descriptive approach should then concentrate on its advantage of absolute
measures.
Klugman et al. (2011) discuss the importance of scale invariance within the context of the
human development index (HDI). If a measure is not scale invariant, the way it is measured
(e.g. using a five point or 10-point policy scale) will affect the rankings. The old HDI for-
mula, like the MPI, API and RPI, tries to avoid this problem by rescaling the index with ref-
erence to minima and maxima. However, this introduces the problem of sensitivity to those
bounds. This is then another source of ‘methodological uncertainty’ that some purport to min-
imise by using the descriptive approach. The most common index approach to scaling data is
to use the form x ¼ yiyminymaxymin: this is found in the RPI and MPI. This attaches a weight (x) to
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the recipient based on its desirability as an aid recipient. To understand the effect of this, con-
sider the weight for the three common factors (population, policy and income) for the median
potential recipient in a hypothetical index. For population, using 2008 data, Nmax is 1.3 billion
(China), Nmin, is 31,000 (Palau), and so the median recipient (Laos, 6.3 million) has a section
weight of 0.005 (calculated using logged population, where China would have a weight of 1
and Palau 0). For income, Guatemala is the median recipient with an income of US$ 4,285
(per capita): the section weight is 0.14 (using logged income data). For policy (WGI), the
median recipient is Malawi with 0.33: the section weight is 0.45. We can think of these as
discounts of 99.5, 86 and 55 per cent, respectively. Therefore, because the typical index scal-
ing method relies on minima and maxima, and population is heavily positively skewed, any
aid to the median recipient in terms of population is essentially dismissed.4
d. How to Aggregate
Once the different aspects of allocative performance have been decided upon and mea-
sured, descriptive approaches commonly aggregate them to create a ranking based on a single
number. While in theory the different factors can be weighted, an equal weighting is often
used. This is chosen more as a default rather than for any inherent attractiveness or theoretical
justification. Ravallion (2012, p. 15) argues that the ‘degree of robustness to weights depends
on the intercorrelations among the components. If these are perfectly correlated then . . . the
result is entirely robust to the choice of weights’. Figure 1 is a scatter graph of poverty and
policy for potential recipients of aid. It shows that the two variables are very highly corre-
lated, but this correlation is negative (the correlation coefficient between income and policy is
0.72). Thus the relative implicit weight given to the two factors will greatly affect any final
rankings. The weight is not just the statistical parameter that is called weight, but rather the
sensitivity of rankings to changes in that part of the data. From the example above, it is clear
that the index method of rescaling the data gives greater weight to population even if this is
aggregated using an ‘equal’ weighting system.
Two approaches to combining the various factors are common: geometric and arithmetic
averages. For example, the geometric average is used by RPI, and an arithmetic average is
used by EW. The simple difference between the two approaches is that under the geometric
approach, donors are punished more for simultaneously performing badly in multiple areas. In
contrast, under the arithmetic average, a given portion of the overall weight is decided by a
specific factor: for example, EW give 50 per cent of the weight to income and 50 per cent to
policy. To illustrate the difference between the two approaches, imagine a recipient exhibited
the median characteristics described above. Using a geometric average, any aid would receive
a weight of 0.000315, whereas under an arithmetic average it would receive 0.199. Thus, aid
given to this imaginary median recipient would either be discounted by 99.99 per cent or 80.1
per cent. The heavily skewed nature of population determines a third of the arithmetic weight,
but completely dominates the geometric average. A further problem with the geometric aver-
age arises when the individual components are allowed to be negative. This could potentially
happen with the RPI, as the minima and maxima are set in relation to data from the first year
of its calculation. Thus, a recipient with either a lower governance score than Afghanistan (in
4 Regression coefficients are not directly comparable, but the strong effect of outliers is widely
recognised. To summarise briefly the difference, they do not use maxima and minima as their points of
reference but deviations from mean values.
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2000) or higher per capita income than Singapore (in 2001) will receive a negative score.
This is troubling as a slight change in one variable could have a large effect on the index.
While unlikely in the case of the RPI, this approach can give perverse results if two compo-
nents are negative. In this case, a recipient would receive a high weight because of its excep-
tionally poor characteristics.
3. SOME SIMPLE TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS
The preceding section separates out the decisions of what to measure, how to measure and
how to aggregate. However, the effect of each decision needs to be understood in conjunction
with the others’. The relative importance of one factor is not determined solely by how fac-
tors are aggregated, but is also influenced by decisions over variables and measurement. This
section examines what effect these decisions have on final rankings, by varying some of these
decisions. It is not a full sensitivity analysis, as the number of possible descriptive measures
makes this impractical (a case of combinatorial explosion). Instead, I show the effect of sim-
ple, minimal diversions from a measure’s implementation, beginning with the EW and KRE
measures. EW uses a headcount method, and so trade-offs between factors are quite easy to
understand. EW calculate the amount of aid going to low income (using a World Bank classi-
fication), free (indicated by a Polity IV democracy score of 8 to 10) and less corrupt countries
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(from the ICRG dataset). This could be viewed as an index method, where potential recipients
receive a weight of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 or 1. There is no change to the weight of a recipient
unless it crosses a boundary: two recipients that have polity scores of 1 and 7 are equally dis-
missed, and recipients with polity scores of 8 and 10 are equally valued. In the same way, all
middle-income countries are discounted, and all low-income countries valued. Unfortunately,
given the proprietary nature of the ICRG data used, I am not able to calculate the effect of
small changes in methodology. In lieu of this, I discuss the specific problems and anomalies
of the headcount approach in this setting.
Table 1 lists the relevant characteristics of six countries, along with the implied weight this
recipient would receive (this abstracts from the ICRG corruption data, and so 0.25 is left off
all recipients). This illustrates the problem of thresholds in the headcount approach, where
large differences in characteristics can mean no difference in the weight, and yet conversely,
small differences that cross a threshold can mean very different weights. So, Senegal and
Argentina are equally dismissed as non-low-income countries whereas Guinea-Bissau and
Kenya are equally valued as low-income countries. Only Argentina and Ghana are valued for
their Polity IV score, with all others receiving the same discount for their low scores. The
table also illustrates a specific problem with the headcount measure in this instance. As shown
in Figure 1, income and policy data is typically highly positively correlated. Because of this,
a headcount measure is more likely to value recipients that just meet a given criterion. In
other words, of all recipients that meet the low income criterion, the relatively richer are the
most likely to meet the policy criteria.
What effect does varying a threshold have? I investigate the effect of changes in the
threshold that determines a country’s classification as ‘free’, as a test of sensitivity of EW
rankings to a minimal methodological change. Easterly and Williamson (2011) use Polity VI
data, where a score of 8 or above is classified as free. I calculate the effect of varying this
threshold to be 7 or above, with original and alternative rankings shown in columns 1 and 2
of Table 2. These rankings only refer to the freedom part of their selectivity measure. There
are substantial rises in the rankings for Austria, Japan and the UK, and large falls for Luxem-
bourg, Sweden and the USA. Only four donors do not move, and the average change in rank-
ing is 2.8 places; the judgement of donor sensitivity to democratic principles is sensitive to
threshold choice. This choice is arbitrary, with little justification or guidance for choosing one
number over another. This sensitivity is perhaps to be expected with a headcount approach.
However, because of the negative correlation between income and governance data (Easterly
and Williamson, 2011) the threshold choices appear crucial.
The KRE differs from the other measures as it uses a regression to determine the scores of
donors. The final score is an arithmetic average of the three coefficient estimates, and as the
TABLE 1
EW Weights for Selected Countries
Recipient GDP per capita Low Income Polity IV Implied EW Weight
Senegal 1,656 No 7 0
Argentina 13,220 No 8 0.25
Guinea-Bissau 966 Yes 6 0.5
Kenya 1,429 Yes 7 0.5
Uganda 1,067 Yes 1 0.5
Ghana 1,375 Yes 8 0.75
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three coefficients are determined simultaneously, the relative weight given to each factor
varies by regression and donor. To test the sensitivity of KRE to methodological differences,
I recalculated it using the WGI as the policy indicator, as opposed to the CPIA.5 No other
methodological points were changed, and the subsequent rankings of the donors can be seen
in column 4 of Table 2 alongside the original ranking in column 3. Only three donors have
the same ranking (Belgium, Luxembourg and New Zealand), and the average change is 2.6
places. Korea and Norway appear to be much worse donors when using the WGI data rather
than the CPIA, dropping from 11th to 17th and from 6th to 12th, respectively. Conversely,
Finland is viewed more favourably, climbing from 16th to 10th. These differences could be
the result of differences in samples, as the coverage of the two variables differs. The WGI
and CPIA share very similar aims, the former even incorporating the latter in its assessment.
For the donors that look worse because the CPIA is used, the WGI is clearly preferable. For
others however, it is difficult to see how an objective decision could be made, and how one
should choose between the two sets of results is far from clear.
TABLE 2
EW and KRE Sensitivity of Bilateral Donor Rankings for 2009
Donor EW Orig. Free if ≥8 EW Alt. Free if ≥7 KRE Orig. CPIA KRE Alt. WGI
Australia 1 1 22 20
Austria 15 7 15 11
Belgium 9 11 7 7
Canada 19 23 9 6
Denmark 21 22 12 8
Finland 13 17 16 10
France 11 9 18 19
Germany 14 10 2 3
Greece 22 20 20 23
Ireland 4 5 4 5
Italy 10 8 19 18
Japan 23 18 5 2
Korea 5 4 11 17
Luxembourg 12 19 14 14
Netherlands 18 21 13 15
New Zealand 2 2 21 21
Norway 6 6 6 12
Portugal 3 3 23 22
Spain 17 15 8 9
Sweden 8 12 10 16
Switzerland 16 14 17 13
UK 20 16 3 1
USA 7 13 1 4
Average change 2.78 2.61
Note:
(i) Orig. and Alt. denotes rankings by the original and alternative methodologies. EW rankings are merely on the aid
to ‘Free’ countries section.
(ii) Average change refers to the average number of places difference between the original and different methodologies.
5 As the WGI variable ranges from 2.5 to 2.5, its log was calculated after adding 3.5.
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Table 3 deals with alterations to the RPI. I take the RPI as representative of indices, as the
API and MPI do not have a specific and detailed canonical method of implementation (e.g.
there is no guidance on selecting the sample). While specific details may differ,6 these argu-
ments apply to the API and MPI in general terms. The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is
a useful concept in understanding the three indices. It describes the amount of one variable
that must be increased to compensate for a shortfall in another. The index method of rescaling
the data means that the maxima and minima in each variable are crucial as they determine
the MRS. The line in Figure 1 represents the MRS used in the RPI, running from the maxi-
mum to the minimum. It can be thought of as an isoquant, where any recipients lying on the
line are equally valued. The best recipient would reside in the south east corner of the graph,
and be both poor and well governed. For GDP per capita, the bounds are $21,869 and $81
given by the 2001 scores of Singapore and the Democratic Republic of Congo, respectively.
For the governance score, the range is 2.25 to 1.44, given by the scores of Afghanistan and
Singapore (2000 data was used as 2001 data do not exist). The RPI equates the two scales:
thus $21,788 per capita dollars (logged) are equated to 3.69 on the WGI policy score. Using
a different sample, variable or base year would change the minima and or maxima, which
would in turn change the MRS and ultimately the relative performance of donors. I examine
each of these methodological choices in turn.
The choice of sample may affect the MRS through deciding the maxima and minima of the
measure. In the RPI, a number of countries are excluded as being rich7 in a decision made by the
researchers in the first year of the CDIs operation, on the basis of which countries were plausible
aid recipients. However, Israel is excluded despite being a very large aid recipient. Neither is it a
strict implementation of an income threshold in 2002, as countries of similar incomes to those
excluded are left in. For example, Portugal (21,372) is excluded as rich whereas Singapore8
(36,076) and Cyprus (23,590) are included. Singapore, a high income country, determines one
end of both policy and income scales, and the inclusion of these high income countries leads to
some surprising implications. For example, Poland received a selectivity weight of 0.47 as a
donor in 2009 (Roodman, 2011a), but in that same year it received a score of 0.59 as a potential
recipient (Roodman, 2011b). Thus, by ceasing to allocate aid to other countries and instead
giving all its aid to itself, Poland would improve its selectivity score by around 25 per cent. This
is not an isolated case as several of the donors that are included in the sample would receive a
higher selectivity score if they reallocated all their aid to themselves: the Czech Republic would
increase from 0.58 to 0.59, Turkey from 0.40 to 0.47 and Hungary from 0.57 to 0.61.
While the RPI methodology does not change and the base year is fixed, it updates every
year such that new data in 2001 is allowed (if applicable) to update the reference points of
maxima and minima. The sample of excluded countries does not include Bermuda, which is
included as a potential recipient for 2009 data, despite having a GDP per capita of 66,268
6 Most notably, the RPI includes policy and not population as a factor, with the associated problem of
greater subjectivity.
7 Specifically, they are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norwich, Por-
tugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Greece, Spain, Canada, USA,
Israel, UAE, Japan, Taiwan and Australia. Thanks are due to David Roodman for clarifying this, and
several other points (personal correspondence).
8 In documentation of the RPI, Singapore’s 2002 GDP per capita is stated to have been 21,869. How-
ever, current data show it as 36,076. It is not clear whether Singapore is actually included in the base
year, where this figure comes from, nor what effect it has had, if any.
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(Roodman, 2011a).9 Currently missing data for other variables in 2002 mean that Bermuda
does not set the income maxima in the base year (with 59,699). If the data were provided, it
would have a large effect on the MRS, with 3.32 on the governance scale equating 59,618 on
the income scale. Table 3 shows the rankings using original methodology in column 1, and
those allowing Bermuda to set the maximum income in column 2. Of the 23 donors, seven
are unchanged, with an average change in ranking of 1.4 places. The seemingly small deci-
sion to include Bermuda means Italy and Australia fall by three places and France and Ger-
many to rise by 3 and 4 places, respectively. These changes are not the result of a large
change in sample, and Bermuda’s exclusion appears to be the result of data coverage rather
than a deliberate decision. Thus, even this small change of sample affects the rank of the
majority of bilateral donors. The decision of which recipients to include is a small detail, was
TABLE 3
RPI Sensitivity of Bilateral Donor Rankings for 2009
Donor RPI Original Different Sample
Including Bermuda
Different Variable Different Year
Highest Lowest
Australia 14 17 16 16 17
Austria 15 13 14 12 14
Belgium 16 18 13 18 18
Canada 9 10 7 8 10
Denmark 1 1 2 1 1
Finland 7 7 15 7 8
France 22 19 19 19 21
Germany 18 14 5 13 15
Greece 23 22 4 19 23
Ireland 3 3 20 3 4
Italy 20 23 6 20 23
Japan 11 9 10 8 10
Korea 6 5 21 4 5
Luxembourg 2 2 1 2 2
Netherlands 13 16 11 13 17
New Zealand 21 20 22 21 23
Norway 12 12 17 11 12
Portugal 4 4 23 3 5
Spain 17 15 3 15 17
Sweden 10 11 18 11 13
Switzerland 5 6 9 6 6
UK 8 8 8 7 9
USA 19 21 12 19 22
Average change 1.39 6.96 1.39 1.43
Note:
(i) The RPI original column was calculated using the maxima and minima reported in Roodman (2011b).
(ii) In columns 4 and 5, as well as Figure 3, I use the actual data and so rankings differ (see footnote 5 for one such
difference).
(iii) Average change refers to the average number of places difference between the original and different
methodologies.
9 This does not receive a negative selectivity weight because the log of income is used.
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taken without any theoretical guidance and was not the strict application of a threshold. I do
not wish to argue that the RPI made the wrong choice in selecting the sample, but rather a
more pessimistic point: there is no obviously superior way of deciding which countries in the
world are potential recipients, and yet this decision has real effects in determining the MRS
and the subsequent rankings of donors.
Column 3 of Table 3 reports the alternate rankings found if the Polity VI variable used by
EW is used instead of the WGI. As aforementioned, changing the variable changes the sample
due to differences in data coverage. Thus, it is to be expected that the measure is more sensi-
tive to the change in variable to allowing one extra data point (the Bahamas in 2002). Even
taking this into account, the differences are striking: an average change of seven places.10
Greece and Portugal switch places due to the change in variable: between 4th and 23rd.
Large changes can also be seen in the rankings of Ireland, Korea, Italy and Spain. If the
Polity VI data were used instead of the WGI, Greece, Italy and Spain would see criticism
replaced with praise, with the opposite effect for Ireland, Portugal and Korea.
Turning to the base year, if 2002 were chosen instead of 2000, the bottom of the policy
range would be Iraq (1.88), and the top of the range would be unchanged (given by
Singapore with 1.44). Assuming the income range was stable, this would equate $21,788
per capita dollars (logged) with 3.32 on the WGI policy scale. To investigate the effect of
such changes, I recalculated the scores of each donor using base years between 1996 and
2008: columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 report the highest and lowest rank of the bilateral donors.
The RPI uses 2001 as the base year as it was the most recent data available in the year the
index started, meaning this exercise can be thought of as a test of how robust the rankings are
to the year the commitment to development index started in. Four donor rankings are unaf-
fected by such a change: Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and Switzerland. For the remaining
19, their performance relative to other donors’ changes depends on which of the 13 years is
used as the reference point. The changes may not seem large: the largest difference is four
places, and the average change is 1.4 places. However, remember that nothing has changed
apart from the base year. The choice of base year determines which of New Zealand, Italy
and Greece was named the worst donor in terms of selectivity, keeping all other methodologi-
cal aspects constant. These changes come from changes in the MRS that result from different
minima and maxima being used. The sensitivity of rankings to the whimsical choice of the
base year is worrying as even the seemingly innocuous decision of base year alters rankings.
The cumulative effect of multiple small decisions can only be larger, which questions the
robustness of the five approaches to even minimal changes in methodology.
4. DISPARITY OF RANKINGS
Despite the pessimism of Section 3, it is possible that the sensitivity of donor allocative
performance measures are academic. If the popular measures concur, then any methodological
difference is perhaps not overly troublesome. For this reason, I recalculate the five measures
and display the results graphically, following Høyland et al. (2012). However, while they dis-
play results of sensitivity tests, Figure 2 shows the (rescaled) raw scores and rankings using
the canonical methodology of the five measures. They were calculated using recent data
(2010 for aid, 2009 for all independent variables) for the 23 OECD/DAC bilateral donors.
10 Note that a completely reversed ranking of 23 donors would have an average change of 11.5 places.
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The exception is Easterly and Williamson (2011) who use a proprietary dataset for gover-
nance, so their original raw scores and rankings are used for the 22 donors that they include
(they exclude Korea) using 2008 data. The left of the Figure shows the raw scores, which are
rescaled to fit between 0 (the worst donor) and 100 (the best donor). The right of the figure
shows the actual rankings from 23 to 1 (the actual scores are shown in Table A1 in the
Appendix). This is not a full sensitivity analysis, but rather a subset of possible judgements.
If more indices were included or the full gamut of possible rankings were explored, we would
expect the range to increase dramatically. It is not a sensitivity test and is more likely to pro-
duce false positives than false negatives, so a failure to show an agreement on this simple test
would be particularly worrying.
In Figure 2, the donors are ranked in descending order of average (rescaled) donor perfor-
mance: the UK is considered to be the best donor, and the worst is Greece. If the measures
tended to concur, there would be a clear diagonal line running from top right to bottom left
in both raw scores and rankings. Instead, we see a great disparity of rankings. The two donors
with the smallest variability are Greece and Ireland, for all others there appears to be real dis-
agreement about how good a donor’s allocation is. The best single donor according to the
RPI, MPI, and KRE and EW measures (Portugal, New Zealand and the USA, respectively)
are ranked, on average, among the worst. For the majority of donors, it is not clear which half
of the distribution they should reside in, and there are few consistent orderings of one donor
over another. It is worth stressing that this is not a test of the effect of the full range of meth-
odological uncertainty: just the results of five popular/recent measures. The disparity of
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The Rescaled Raw Scores and Rankings of Bilateral Donors, 2009
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descriptive results is not a recent trend – White and McGillivray (1995) proposed two mea-
sures that met their criteria which gave results that had a rank correlation of zero.
a. Undermined by Their Own Flexibility
The aim of the various indices is to change the behaviour they measure. It is often envis-
aged that this acts through education of the public, which in turn leads to political pressure.
Alternatively, some see indices highlighting certain technical matters to the governments
themselves. Regardless of the mechanism, the aim is undermined by the disparity of rankings:
a mass of contradictory judgements offers neither clear technical advice11 nor consistent polit-
ical pressure. The preference for methodological simplicity, in the hope that this minimises
methodological uncertainty, seems somewhat misguided. The sensitivity of measures and the
disparity of judgements are the natural consequence of methodological uncertainty within the
descriptive tradition. The choices of what to include, how to measure these factors and aggre-
gate these findings are important decisions which greatly affect the final rankings, and must
be taken with little theoretical direction. It is hard to believe that the goal of advocacy
through increased public awareness would survive a debate on methodological differences of
indices, with popular opinion settling upon a preferred index. The result is a multitude of
fragile and contradictory judgements which are all potentially valid, their differences stem-
ming from justifiable choices of what to include, how to measure those variables and the
aggregation methodology. Today, a donor that is ranked poorly by one measure need not state
it is based on value judgements; it could merely point to its high scores from a different
measure.
5. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The evidence presented here is not positive regarding indices – the rankings they produce
are neither robust nor in agreement. This section discusses possible future directions in the
light of this evidence. First, I discuss whether more aggregation might be a viable way for-
ward. Second, I discuss the opposite direction – whether disaggregation might sidestep the
most intractable problems of the descriptive approach. Third, I question the value of the
approach itself, asking whether the approach has anything to offer despite its limitations.
a. More Aggregation
Høyland et al. (2012) follow the Worldwide Governance Indicators and seek to resolve the
problem of aggregation by resorting to more aggregation, in quality and quantity. Thus, rather
than aggregating merely the point estimates of different measures, they seek to aggregate the
range of estimates. This allows a statement regarding the sensitivity to certain assumptions.
I do not choose this route. Section 3 shows that indices are not robust to even small changes
in methodology. Section 4, dealing with what is in essence a small subset of a sensitivity
analysis, shows that there are very large bands of uncertainty in final rankings. A fuller sensi-
tivity analysis would vary what factors are included (population, policy and poverty), which
11 Geddes (2012, p. 8) recently stated that ‘the conflicting nature of the results they [indices] provide is
not helpful for policy-makers’.
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variables are chosen to represent them (e.g. logged real GDP per capita or GNI in current
prices), the scale used to measure them (e.g. the typical index method, a regression or head-
count approach), the aggregation method employed (geometric or arithmetic) and other meth-
odological choices (e.g. the base year and sample used). This would clearly give much
greater variance of possible judgements than the five measures displayed in Figure 2. Ironi-
cally, given the deliberate choice to move away from an econometrically advanced approach,
descriptive research may soon be aptly described by Leamer’s (1983, p. 37) classic critique of
econometric work: ‘hardly anyone takes anyone else’s data analyses seriously’.
b. Less Aggregation
An alternative is to present a disaggregated index. This does not avoid all of the problems
of the descriptive approach as there is still uncertainty over which factors are relevant and the
best way to measure them; both could lead to disparate judgements. However, disaggregation
does avoid the pitfall of deciding upon how best to aggregate them, and therefore does not
need to decide upon the appropriate MRS. This in itself makes the methodology of measure-
ment less important, as it no longer determines the relevant importance of each factor. Within
the descriptive tradition, Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006) is the only disaggregated presenta-
tion of donor allocative performance of which I am aware. This approach is presumably
unpopular because of the difficulty in assimilating the information for the reader, due to the
lack of a ranking mechanism. For this reason, I follow White and Woestman (1994) who, in
similar debate (on general donor performance) on the wisdom and method of aggregation,
promoted a graphical alternative to aggregation used by Ashuvud (1986). The graph used was
a four axes ‘diamond’ where the distance from the centre denoted the size of a measure
(exactly the same type of graph that is now used by Birdsall and Kharas, 2010). A downside
of the graph is that it is not easy to display several donors on the same graph. Donor alloca-
tive performance is related to just three factors, making it easier to display graphically.
Figure 3 succinctly displays the sensitivity of 23 donors to poverty, policy and population
in absolute terms. Specifically, they are the coefficients taken from three bivariate regressions
per donor: logged aid regressed on logged population, logged (PPP) income per capita and
policy (Worldwide Governance Indicator average). The x-axis represents the income coeffi-
cient (times by 1 so that it represents poverty not income), the y-axis is the policy coeffi-
cient and the size of the circle reflects the population coefficient. Thus a donor with high
poverty, policy and population sensitivity would have a large circle in the north-east corner of
the graph. France has a population coefficient of around 1, whereas Portugal has no circle, as
its population coefficient is negative. In Figure 3, only two donors have positive coefficient
estimates for policy – Luxembourg and Austria. Greece is a particularly worrying donor here
as it gives more aid to richer and less well-governed recipients in absolute terms. The other
20 donors all reside in the south-east quadrant – a clear sign that donors are income sensitive
but not policy sensitive (a common finding in the positive literature, see Easterly, 2007; Hout,
2007; Clist, 2011). This point is underlined when examining the scales of the axes. Some
donors are remarkably similar – Canada, Belgium, Finland and Japan all overlap. There is
also a clear trend for smaller donors to have a greater small country bias, perhaps as they seek
to concentrate on recipients for whom they can give relatively substantial aid flows.
While not a perfect solution, this approach maintains the ability for non-specialist readers
to quickly assimilate the information. The disaggregated form also makes clear the trade-offs
that donors have made: some may be more poverty sensitive, whereas others are more popula-
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tion sensitive. By aggregating, the researcher imposes a marginal rate of substitution, and the
donors are ranked according to that MRS. The graphical approach makes clear the MRS that
each donor implicitly uses. Roodman (2011b, p. 483) admits that ‘aggregation hides at least
as much as it reveals’. While the approach taken here is not amenable to an index with more
factors, the graphical presentation reveals more than a simple index in the case of donor allo-
cative performance. It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words: Figure 3 is worth
some 69 bivariate regressions.
c. Abandon Indices
Given the evidence presented earlier, it is worth fundamentally questioning the value of
the descriptive approach. Final rankings are fragile to minimal changes in methodology, and
popular measures have a very low degree of consensus. Is a graphical option (or other disag-
gregated approach) a credible way forward, given that it does not solve all of the problems
associated with current rankings? There are two aspects of the descriptive approach that make
it (potentially) worthwhile: one technical and the other pragmatic. First, I argue, like Easterly
and Williamson (2011), that the advantage comes from using absolute judgements to comple-
ment explanatory approaches. Descriptive analysis is unique in that it can answer questions
regarding absolute poverty, population and policy sensitivity, where more econometrically
advanced methods are only able to answer such questions conditional on other factors.
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Second, while rankings (and graphical presentations) based on simple measures may not be
a first-best solution, they have become popular because of an understandable desire to judge
donor performance. Furthermore, it is clear that the descriptive approach can be more simply
understood by non-specialists, in a way that is not the case with more econometrically
advanced work. This advantage threatens to be undermined by fragile and contradictory
judgements, but the potential advantage should not be dismissed.
The reader must judge whether these two reasons are enough to counteract the weaknesses
of the approach. Pragmatically however, it appears likely that descriptive approaches will con-
tinue to be used regardless of their fragility. It is in this context that I recommend graphical
presentations that avoid aggregation but maintain a simple presentation of donor performance:
not as a first-best solution but as an improvement on fragile rankings.
6. CONCLUSION
The aim of descriptive measures is laudable: to improve aid effectiveness by encouraging
good allocative practice. Because the imagined mechanism for changing allocative behaviour
includes increased public awareness of the issues, simplicity in measurement and presentation
has been valued. The latter has been fruitful, as rankings have successfully increased public
discussion and involvement in the issues of donor allocative behaviour. However, it appears
naive to claim that in favouring simpler methods, the descriptive literature has minimised
methodological uncertainty. I have shown that even minimal changes to methodology result
in different rankings, and often in very different rankings. Changes such as whether to include
or exclude a single recipient, the variable used and the base year lead to non-trivial changes.
The choice of factors, measurement approach and aggregation technique would logically lead
to even larger differences in final rankings. The aggregate effect of the inherent whimsy in
popular descriptive measures is that of substantial sensitivity to methodology. Similarly, com-
peting measures, implemented using the canonical model, give contradictory judgements. The
range of possible opinions in a full sensitivity analysis of selectivity would surely be even lar-
ger than the actual range of opinions discussed here. The lack of clear theoretical or technical
dominance of one approach over another means a plurality of opinions are potentially valid.
This sensitivity to small technical details and disagreement in final rankings threatens to
undermine increased public awareness, as methodological ambiguity belies the false certainty
of unambiguous rankings. In future, donors would not need to claim that a poor judgement of
their performance was a ‘certain value judgement’; it could merely point to a competing mea-
sure that praised their performance. Indeed, Kihara (2012, p. 3–4) recently defended Japanese
aid using such an argument: ‘some empirical studies, including studies presented here, seem
to contradict the findings of the CGD. A number of recent studies have ranked aid donors by
various indicators of their aid-giving and in some of these Japanese aid has been ranked
toward the upper end of donor countries’. The problems with indices notwithstanding, their
advantages mean demand for them is likely to continue, and with this in mind, a graphical
approach is recommended as a way of avoiding some of the largest problems. Much, but cer-
tainly not all, of the disagreement in final rankings can be avoided if distinct elements of an
index are left in disaggregated form. This approach has not been embraced as disaggregation
has typically meant poor presentation, which would undermine the intermediate goal of public
communication and engagement. Section 5 proposes a graphical solution to the resulting
impasse, combining disaggregation with a presentation that is easy to understand. The graph
displays the poverty, policy and population sensitivity of 23 donors in absolute terms
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(although the graph could equally display conditional results). In doing so, the marginal rate
of substitution is not imposed on the rankings, but can be inferred by the reader. In fact, the
graph does not even impose decision of the appropriate factors, as a reader could choose to
ignore one of the three dimensions. I argue that the descriptive approach is a useful comple-
ment to explanatory research. In that vein, recent findings of low policy sensitivity and high
income sensitivity in explanatory research (Easterly, 2007; Hout, 2007; Clist, 2011) is echoed
in Figure 3. This enables researchers to have more confidence in the result as this is found in
both conditional and absolute terms using explanatory and descriptive approaches. Measuring
absolute sensitivity (i.e. not controlling for other factors) also makes clear the inherent dichot-
omy that donors face (see Figure 1): richer countries tend to be better governed. As such the
advice of Collier and Dollar (2002) to be both income and policy sensitive is easier to give
than to follow; the graphical method confirms that donors generally choose the former. The
method makes clear the difficult choice that donors face, but also highlights the donors that
fare poorly. By measuring donor performance better, it is hoped that unprofitable debate over
the correct index is avoided, and the focus remains on increasing donor performance by
measuring it.
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APPENDIX
This appendix includes the rankings and rescaled raw scores used to make Figure 2. The
methods used are those of the original measures, with data and Stata do files available to
download from https://sites.google.com/site/paulclist/data. The rankings may differ from else-
where in the paper as I restrict the measures in the table to use the same sample.
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TABLE A1
Raw Scores and Rankings for Bilateral Donors, 2009
Donor Rescaled Raw Performances Rankings
EW API MPI RPI KRE EW API MPI RPI KRE
Australia 82.1 21.4 92.4 71.8 4 4 13 8 4 22
Austria 0 28.9 94.9 46.7 62.6 22 8 4 11 15
Belgium 28.4 12.5 94.2 28.3 86.5 16 19 5 18 5
Canada 53.7 21.8 81.4 59.8 80 9 12 16 6 9
Denmark 69.5 20.2 84.8 94.3 69.9 7 15 13 2 12
Finland 71.6 29.8 92.6 57.2 61.4 6 7 7 10 16
France 43.2 25.5 0 22.3 48.2 12 9 23 20 18
Germany 46.3 93.1 89.6 37.6 98 11 2 9.5 15 2
Greece 7.4 3.1 76.4 0 34.3 20 22 19 23 20
Ireland 64.2 31.9 97.4 80.3 87.7 8 4 3 3 4
Italy 2.1 19.2 88.5 9.7 35.7 21 17 12 22 19
Japan 74.7 89.5 50.5 59.2 86.1 5 3 20 8 6
Korea – 30.9 81.2 44 71.7 – 6 17 13 11
Luxembourg 89.5 12.3 84.1 69.2 67.3 2 20 15 5 14
Netherlands 33.7 22 11.1 35.9 69.7 15 11 22 17 13
New Zealand 100 5.3 100 18.2 9.3 1 21 1 21 21
Norway 38.9 30.9 77.1 36.9 85.9 13 5 18 16 7
Portugal 35.8 0 99.8 100 0 14 23 2 1 23
Spain 51.6 15.2 89.6 43.2 81.6 10 18 9.5 14 8
Sweden 21.1 21.3 84.2 45.9 74.1 18 14 14 12 10
Switzerland 23.2 20 93.1 58.3 49.7 17 16 6 9 17
UK 84.2 100 89.2 59.4 94.5 3 1 11 7 3
USA 12.6 22.9 23.7 24.2 100 19 10 21 19 1
20 P. CLIST
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